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Discussion After the Speech of Henry T. King, Jr.
QUESTION: Mr. O'Grady: Henry, I would like to congratulate
you on your work at Nuremberg; I have read the opening summation of
Robert Jackson to the Nuremberg tribunal many times, and it is an
inspiring piece of writing.
I would like to ask you this: it seems to me that we are somewhat
at the stage that the English were in the 1830's, when Sir Robert
Peale, against a great deal of opposition got approval for the concept of
the Metropolitan London Police Force, and got financing for it. The
English sense of justice then had the backing of a police force. This is
probably simplistic, but it does seem to me that what the world needs
very badly now is a police force.
The situation in Bosnia calls for a real police force. There should
be one or two armies mobile at the disposition of the Security Council,
five or six divisions with armed transport and air support, and the contributing nations have to be prepared to pay for it and they have to be
prepared to take the casualties that would be inevitable in sending such
a force into the mountains of Bosnia or wherever. The difficulties are
numerous.
If such an army or police force had been sent into Somalia, would
it have succeeded any better? Who knows. But I do not think that we
are going to be able to move much further into a real system of world
order unless we get a police force.
It must be many years away, but, on the basis of your experience,
do you think that we might someday achieve a world police force?
ANSWER: Professor King: When my testimony was submitted
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and when we discussed it at our Nuremberg prosecutors' reunion, we thought we had
such a police force, because the U.N. Security Council had mobilized
against Saddam, and we thought that this was the beginning of such a
force. In other words, the U.N. had a police force, and although it was
ad hoc, Saddam was within our grasp.
The action by the U.N. Security Council is another alternative to
creating a police force. I think the rules for the operation of the war
crimes tribunal in Yugoslavia, from my reading of Rule 11 and Rule
59, seem to indicate that the tribunal is to have backup from the UN
Security Council. That is another alternative to the standing army concept, but we lost a golden moment when we did not go for Saddam,
because the evidence was all televised. It was right there before our
eyes. The Nazi evidence was in their files. Nuremberg was a very documentary case, but in the case of Iraq, all we had to do was look at the
television, and we would use those pictures as evidence. So, it should be
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done either on an ad hoc basis, or the ideal is the way you suggest, and
that is the concept I had when I came back from Nuremberg.
It is, however, hard to sell an idea of an international standing
army. When I worked with the United World Federalists, I found that
it was very hard to get it accepted. So, I changed tactics and worked
through the American Bar Association to help in getting the idea
accepted.
To answer your question, the idea of an international standing
army is good, but an ad hoc force is another, possibly more doable way
to do it.
QUESTION: Mr. Kloos: At Nuremberg there seemed to be contradictions. For example, Albert Speer was imprisoned for 20 years,
and yet people who were underneath him got hung. Could you explain
the reason for something like that, Professor King?
ANSWER: Professor King: Well, one of the points to keep in
mind at Nuremberg is that the defendants said they were ordered by
Hitler to do the things they did.
What you were up against at Nuremberg was that there were
many people who were still sold on Adolf Hitler. I talked with Herman
Goering on September 28, 1946 just before he committed suicide. He
felt that Hitler was the greatest person that had ever lived.
So you had numbers of people who denied their active complicity.
They said that they took orders from Hitler, they did only what he told
them to do. There were other people, like Kaltenbrunner, who said they
really did not participate, even though their signature and handwriting
indicated that they had. Albert Speer was the only one who indicated
any sense of guilt. In effect he pleaded guilty at Nuremberg in his final
statement.
About 15 years later, I talked with Hans Flachsner who was his
counsel, and he told Speer not to say "I take responsibility." He told
Speer that if he took responsibility, they would hang him.
Speer got mitigation for two reasons: First, implicitly because of
what he said in terms of accepting responsibility, and secondly, he prevented the obliteration of Germany, because there was an order which
was initiated by Martin Bormann and signed by Hitler for the destruction of all industrial facilities in Germany. Speer went around to the
facilities, at great personal risk, and he told the generals not to carry
the order out. Then, he went into the bunker April 24, 1945, just
before Hitler died, he told him that he disobeyed the order, and he
expected to be executed. Hitler had just executed his brother-in-law for
disobeying his orders.
So Albert Speer had a degree of personal courage which the other
defendants did not have. He was a demonstration of an acceptance of
the Nuremberg principles. That is why he had a twenty year sentence
rather than death. He told me later, just before he died, that he felt
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justice was done at Nuremberg.
QUESTION: Mr. Champagne: Professor King, to what extent do
you feel that the new judges, nominated for the court for Yugoslavia,
will feel bound to follow the rules that you laid down in Nuremberg, or
what we call the Law of Nuremberg?
ANSWER: Professor King. The rules are very precisely drafted to
follow the Nuremberg Charter. They deal with war crimes; crimes
against the customs and laws of war; and crimes against humanity,
murder and ill treatment of individuals for racial, religious or political
reasons. The judges are sort of hemmed-in by what was done at Nuremberg, because the Security Council Resolution establishing the
court for Yugoslavia explicitly follows the Nuremberg charter in many
respects.
Now, one thing that was done regarding the war crimes in Yugoslavia is that the Security Council resolution specified punishment, and
the punishment is not as extreme as it was in Nuremberg. Death by
hanging was the penalty at Nuremberg if you were found guilty of
major crimes. In. Yugoslavia, it is a sentence of a term of years; so
there is a difference.
And as I pointed out, in the Yugoslav situation, the defendant has
to be there. Now to get the defendant there, one device would be economic sanctions against the country that withholds a defendant. They
can also be tried in other countries. For example, there is one Serbian
war criminal who is in German custody at the present time. He has not
been tried, but he is in custody.
In the Yugoslavia situation then, they are not stopping national
courts but the international court at the Hague would have priority
over national courts if there is a conflict.
QUESTION: Mr. Champagne: Do you think if they succeed this
time, they would end up having a permanent court under the United
Nations?
ANSWER: Professor King- Well, that is what we are aiming for.
If we could show that an ad hoc U.N. court worked, then we would
have a good demonstration project.
That is one of the hopes, because what we have in operation at the
Hague is a court with, among others, a U.S. judge, a Canadian judge,
and an Italian judge presiding, and money has been appropriated for it,
so I think it has a potential for getting somewhere.
QUESTION: Ms. Leibman: Professor King, if the Serbs win the
war, and even if they do not, how will we get a hold of these criminals
to try them? In your opinion, do you really think it is realistic that the
tribunal will actually be able to try these people?
ANSWER: Professor King- Well, I think that it is realistic. The
hope is that the U.N. Security Council will give this tribunal, which is
its own creation, a backing which is not explicit in the resolution.
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One thing I noticed is that the Russians are less supportive of the
Serbs at this time. There are indications that they are tired of the Serbian activities. So maybe that is a hope, that they would not veto the
resolution giving further backing to the Tribunal.
The Security Council took military action against Saddam so
maybe they could support the Tribunal in the Serbian Case. It is a
possibility, but I am not going to forecast what they do.
QUESTION: Ms. Leibman: Will it have any effect on the Tribunal if the Serbs do in fact win the war? At Nuremberg, the allies were
victorious; with Saddam once again we were victorious. Will this make
a difference?
ANSWER: Professor King: It might make a difference positively
if the Serbs won the war, because they would be alienated from the
international community. If there is a negotiated peace - and I have
talked with the New York Times reporter who covered the war - they
are more likely to insist being forgiven for their sins.
In other words, the terms of the negotiated peace might include at
the Serb's demand, some exemption from punishment. But, if the Serbs
win, they will be on the outside looking in, and my feeling is that punishment from the Tribunal might be more likely if the Serbs win than
if they do not. What you have to worry about for this Tribunal is the
possibility of peace terms, under which if there are concessions made
by the Serbs, there might be concessions on trying Serbian war
criminals. I hope not, but that is what the possibility is.
QUESTION: Mr. Stock: Along those lines is an underlying philosophical question, which really lies at the heart of Nuremberg, and that
is whether the Nuremberg principles really apply logically in any situation other than at that failed aggression.
Nuremberg really proves only that if you win, you can nail the
loser, if the loser violated international law. And so I ask whether the
Nuremberg principle can logically be extended to a successful aggressor. Do we have the international mechanisms that allow us to do that.
And a related issue is, it seems that the resolution that has been
passed with respect to Bosnia turns Nuremberg on its head, because it
specifically avoids trying the Serbs for crimes against peace, and yet, as
I understand it, it is the very crime against peace which was the lynch
pin of the Nuremberg prosecution. So how are we going to try to prosecute the Serbs without prosecuting them for having waged a war of
aggression, in a circumstance in which they may very well not be a
defeated aggressor?
ANSWER: Professor King: On your first point, I think it depends
on the size of the aggressor. You could have small aggressors that win,
who warrant the condemnation of the international community, and
can get hurt, maybe even obliterated by economic sanctions.
So, you can have a situation where the small aggressor, like the
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Serbs can win, but there are still other means of punishment, such as
economic sanctions, which can be very destructive. They were very destructive in South Africa, where they are having elections this weekend,
because of economic sanctions.
Now, in terms of the lack of the aggressive war count in Yugoslavia, I think that was a conscious decision by the people who wrote the
resolution, because they did not want to get into the argument that it
was ex post facto. That it had not been defined as a crime beforehand
was the same argument used in Nuremberg.
In Yugoslavia, they did not want to muddy the water. I think the
main thing there was to simplify it: war crimes, crimes against humanity, the horrors you see every night on television. The evidence is replete; it is right there. I think that was a conscious decision. I think
they could have gone further. I think they could have gone for crimes
against peace.
Now, with Saddam, there were crimes against peace, because the
tanks rolled into Kuwait and the armies were marching; you had televised evidence there. So there was a perfect opportunity to charge Saddam with crimes against peace. I think it was just a strategic decision
to simplify it.
QUESTION: Mr. Stock: Do you see any circumstances under
which the Nuremberg principle could ever have applied to a defender
against aggression who used excessive force, who committed crimes
against humanity, or otherwise violated laws of war?
ANSWER: Professor King: The Nuremberg principle says that to
have a crime against humanity, you have to have a crime of aggression.
That is the way the Nuremberg judgment reads.
In other words, crimes against humanity at Nuremberg does not
stand on its own bottom; it is not self contained. It has to be pursuant
to some other crime, such as a crime of aggression.
So, I think that crimes against humanity were at Nuremberg, defined to be limited to the period of the war. But I think since that time,
the concept has been extended to cover crimes of genocide during
peacetime too.
QUESTION: Mr. Le Forestier: Could you address why the UN
seems to have had a change of heart in that it did not pursue prosecution of war crimes after Saddam Hussein did what he did.
In Africa once western oil supplies were secured, it seemed that
the interest of the U.N. was gone, but in the former Yugoslavia, you
have war crimes occurring on European soil in the so-called powder keg
of Europe, which the U.N. seems now interested in prosecuting. Could
you address why that might be?
ANSWER: ProfessorKing- Yes, I think the big thing is that it is
hard to get an initiative going. It is the public support that seemed to
be for the trial for war crimes in Yugoslavia, and I emphasized that in
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my remarks. Public support -for change is very important, and Yugoslavia was really identifiable; it was immediate in the European area. Yugoslavia, after all, is the first time we have pursued prosecution since
Nuremberg.
I think it was a start, at least. I am sure that there are war crimes
being committed in Ethiopia and in other places in Africa, but I think
that the important thing is that at least this was something where everybody agreed something should be done.
Now, one thing to keep in mind is that this took place May 25,
1993; it was during the regime of Clinton. So you have had a change of
heart in the administration in Washington. And as I have mentioned,
the United States is a key player in Europe.
I think that Yugoslavia is right in the innards of Europe, and there
are people in the U.S. and in other countries who have relatives there.
So I think there are ties there that were not present in some of the
other places.
QUESTION: Mr. Chen: If we were to envision that we have in
place an international court again, which was to prosecute criminals for
war crimes, how would it be funded, and what kind of power would the
smaller countries have in the control of this?
ANSWER: ProfessorKing. I think it will be funded to the extent
that the Security Council deems necessary and there are indications
that $40 million will be appropriated by the U.N. Security Council for
the Court at the Hague. $3 million has been appropriated to date. This
is a start. Now, this is primarily paid by the United States and other
major powers, and your point is well taken, that the little countries do
not have as much to say about this at the present time as they might
have in the future.
The Security Council is the one that passed the resolution. That
means that it involves the big countries. This, however, is just a start.
The Yugoslav tribunal is relying on the Security Council for its
backup. So the driving force is the Security Council under the U.N.
Charter at the present time. It would have to be changed to give little
countries a say.
QUESTION: Mr. Chen: If there were world peace by now, how
would it stay intact in your vision? How would it maintain the status
quo?
ANSWER: Professor King Well, you would have to have a regular appropriation for a tribunal that would be part of the U.N. budget.
But it is important that the United Nations do it, rather than just any
group. One thing that was encouraging about Nuremberg was that four
major countries did it and that nine other smaller countries acceded to
the Nuremberg principles. So we had good support from the small
countries as well as the big countries.
QUESTION: Mr. Stock: What do you see is the risk that this
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tribunal, once constituted, would become something of a runaway international grand jury, prosecuting willy-nilly under a broadly construed
human rights genocide charter, and thereby realizing the worst fears of
the opponents of the genocide convention?
What is the risk, as you see it, that such a body would begin to
increase its expanse of powers and interpret the genocide convention
and other underlying documents in a way to reach peacetime activities
of other than aggressor nations, and bring them before the bar of world
justice?
ANSWER: ProfessorKing: The charter of the tribunal in the former Yugoslavia, which was the U.N. resolution, says that the territory
of the tribunal is the former Yugoslavia. I think that is very important.
It is very much under the control of the U.N. Security Council. The
definitions tie it to a particular territory so that it cannot be all over the
line.
Now, one of the things about the Code of Crimes Against the
Peace and Security of Mankind is that it does not contain a final effective definition of aggression. The Code indicates that the UN Security
Council will define aggression. So it is pretty tightly controlled.
It is important to keep in mind is that to operate this tribunal
requires funding, and there are some implicit controls there which are
linked to funding. In the past, when U.N. activities have gone beyond
the bounds of what many countries thought they should have, the water
was turned off on the funding. So funding is linked to control.
I think that it is pretty well tied up to the source of your authority,
and the source of your support. And the U.N. Security Council includes some of the major powers in the world, including the United
States some other big ones.
QUESTION: Mr. Kloos: Not to open a can of worms, but Israel
really prosecuted John Demjanjuk. Can you comment on that situation,
especially with regard to the idea that the evidence was difficult to
gather after that many years, in terms of the eye-witness testimony?
ANSWER: Professor King- Well, I do not think that there would
be any purpose in commenting on the Demjanjuk case. I think there
were a lot of mistakes made. I think it is a judgment call as to whether
he is guilty or not. He was really a minor person. Also, you are concerned with other factors such as the administration of the immigration
laws of the United States and whether Israel was a proper place to try
him.
I have very definite opinions on this, but I would like to leave everybody in this room with a good taste in their mouth for this evening.
I do want to point out, however, that a Frenchman, who is accused
of war crimes in France, was tried and convicted and sentenced to life
imprisonment the other day in France, indicating that the Nuremberg
principles are still viable in France. They have also been viable in Ger-
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many. People are still being tried. So they are alive and well today, and
they do not need my comment on the John Demjanjuk case.

